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TERRORISM AND RESOURCE CORRUPTION       1 
Abstract 
As foreign fighters, who had previously traveled to the Middle East to conduct operations 
under the flag of ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), return to the Philippines and other 
countries in Southeast Asia, they are bringing their ideologies and knowledge of terrorist 
operations with them. In addition to tracking the growing trend of terrorist attacks being 
conducted in the Philippines in the name of ISIL, it is crucial to determine how these returning 
fighters are gathering the funds and resources necessary to carry out these attacks and establish 
new terrorist cells. This question of how returning terrorists are funding their growing operations 
in the Philippines is the main question of this paper. A list of indicators was generated to 
determine which outcome is most likely taking place: returning fighters are not setting up new 
cells, new cells are being funded mainly by corruption of the natural resource extraction industry, 
or cells are being funded mainly by other means. After running 50 data points through the 
indicators, it was determined that terrorists are most likely exploiting corruption channels already 
present in the natural resource industry in the Philippines, especially mining operations, as well 
as using charities to launder funds. 
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The Rising Risk of Terrorism in the Philippines and Natural Resource Corruption 
 
On May 23, 2017, two ISIL-supported terrorist organizations, the Maute Group and Abu 
Sayyaf, engaged the Philippine government security forces in what would end up being a five 
month siege on the city of Marawi in the southern Philippines.  The fighting was initiated by the 1
Philippine government’s failed attempt to capture the leader of the Abu Sayyaf group, Isnilon 
Hapilon, and quickly spiraled into what is said to be the longest urban battle in the history of the 
Philippines.  At the end of the five months, over 1,170 people had been killed, including 960 2
militants. The duration of the siege has been attributed to different causes depending on the 
expert or government is asked, but a common thread amongst the reasons is the fact that the 
militants of both Abu Sayyaf and the Maute group were transferred around USD $600,000 and 
weapons by central ISIL to continue the fight in Marawi. The rising rates of terrorist activity in 
the Philippines, the duration to which the activity can be extended, and the known transfers of 
funds and resources from ISIL to affiliate terrorist organizations in the area all point to a trend of 
increased interest in the Philippines as the next battlefield amongst ISIL decision-makers.  3
The resources and funds required to support the activities of terrorist organizations must 
be available or at least exploitable by the organization before said organization can effectively 
carry out attacks. The end of the Cold War marked a big change in terrorist financing and the 
1 Quilala, D. (2018). Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines. 
Southeast Asian Affairs,​ 285-296. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26492782 
2 Habulan, A., Taufiqurrohman, M., Jani, M., Bashar, I., Zhi’An, F., & Yasin, N. (2018). Southeast Asia: 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Online Extremism. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses,​ ​10​(1), 7-30. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26349853 
3 Nahdohdin, M., Angelianawati, D., Prasetya, A., Yaoren, K., Dhanaraj, J., Bashar, I., . . . Nasir, A. (2019). 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore. ​Counter Terrorist Trends 
and Analyses,​ ​11​(1), 6-32. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26568577 
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ways in which terrorist organizations procure funds for their activities. The organizations that 
had once been state-sponsored, now found themselves in need of new avenues of revenue and so 
turned to criminal activities. This new trend was most apparent in the rise of narco-terrorism as it 
emerged in Latin America in the 1980s, but did not emerge as a serious problem until the early 
1990s.   The focus of this paper, however, is the connection between criminal exploitation and 4
terrorism in Sotheast Asia.  
In general, the modern history of radical Islamic terrorism can be understood in three 
phases, all of which have had a significant impact on the countries of Southeast Asia, even 
though the terroristic activity in the region is relatively less when compared to the Middle East. 
Ryacudu explained the differences in operations and goals amongst Islamic extremists in the 
form of three different phases. In the first, or al-Qaeda-centric Fphase, an estimated 400 terrorist 
fighters from Southeast Asia travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan for combat training and 
experience before they returned home.  This first wave of fighters was not trained with the 5
intention of fighting in the Middle East, but rather to become leaders of their own cells. These 
fighters would go on to create some of the most (currently) active terrorist organizations of 
Southeast Asia: Jemaah Salafiyyah in Thailand, Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM), Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Singapore and Indonesia.  6
In the second, or IS-centric phase, additional organizations emerged throughout the region, with 
a greater concentration appearing in the Philippines, almost all either having sprung from ISIL 
4 Makarenko, T. (2004). The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised 
Crime and Terrorism. ​Global Crime​, ​6​(1), 129–145. doi: 10.1080/1744057042000297025 
5 Ryacudu, R. (2018). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks. ​Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(11), 1-3. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26514859 
6 Ibid. 
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leadership and training or pledging their allegiance to IS.  As ISIL continues to lose ground, 7
men, and resources in Iraq and Syria, the threat that this organization poses has evolved as it 
becomes more decentralised and many fighters return home, while still believing in the ISIL 
ideology. It is this return of extremist fighters to their home countries that qualifies the third 
phase modern terrorism.  
The threat of the third phase of terrorism was most exemplifed in the Marawi Siege that 
took place in the Philippines on May 23rd of 2017 and lasted until October 23rd of the same 
year. 165 soldiers, 47 civilians, and 919 terrorists were killed while almost 1700 security 
personnel were wounded during the siege.  The high-risk areas with regards to the emergence of 8
new cells constitute the southernmost part of the Indochina peninsula and the Philippines, mainly 
in the coastal areas.  Many of these areas also constitute some of the most natural resource-rich 9
and economically productive areas of the region. This third wave of terrorism is most dangerous 
to Southeast Asia as it most likely signifies a shift in the interest of ISIL leaders of waging jihad 
in the Middle East, to trying to establish a ​wilayah​, or controlled region, in Southeast Asia.   10
These fighters, first, will need resources and funds as they return to their homelands and 
attempt to recruit additional fighters for new cells​. I argue that as ISIS and other extremist 
organizations continue to lose significant control over land and resources in Syria and 
surrounding regions, there is evidence that the groups are turning to Southeast Asia as a new 
7 Ibid. 
8 De Leon, R., Rufo, M., & Pablo, M. (2018). Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: 
Grassroots Empowerment and Development of Homeland Security Framework. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses,​ ​10​(8), 10-17. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26481829 
9 Zhang, X., Jin, M., Fu, J., Hao, M., Yu, C., & Xie, X. (2018). On the Risk Assessment of Terrorist Attacks 
Coupled with Multi-Source Factors. ​ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information​, ​7​(9), 354. doi: 
10.3390/ijgi7090354 
10 Ryacudu, R. (2018). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks. ​Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(11), 1-3. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26514859 
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possible region to control. The question that needs to be answered is whether there is a 
significant probability that returning fighters are establishing additional cells in the pursuit of 
establishing a ​wilayah​ in the Philippines and, if so, are they exploiting natural resources for 
funds or are they using other avenues to father funds. One way the groups would be able to gain 
a stronger foothold in southeast asia and gather the necessary resources to fund a shift in regional 
focus is through the exploitation of natural resources and the control of extractive industries. 
 
Literature Review 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia 
The literature first exampines how jihad is defined and pursued within the region of 
Southeast Asia. ISIL militants have already conducted terrorist attacks, armed assaults, target 
killings, and bombings against state security and civilians in the Philippines.  Experts point to 11
the fact that ISIL needs to increase their presence in Southeast Asia so as to have a better path for 
expansion into South Asia and Central Asia.  Their following in both South and Southeast Asia 12
appears to be increasing as they gain traction among a new generation of educated youth in the 
urban middle and upper-middle classes. The change of demographics and geography of this new 
ISIL movement has also produced a change in the composition of ISIL cells in that they are more 
decentralized, harder to track, and there are more lone-wolf actors in these regions.  13
A study conducted by Habulan et al. found that ISIL has actually loosened the 
requirements for what constitutes a jihad as they continue to lose ground in the Middle East. 
11 De Leon, R., Rufo, M., & Pablo, M. (2018). Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: 
Grassroots Empowerment and Development of Homeland Security Framework. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses,​ ​10​(8), 10-17. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26481829 
12 Basit, A. (2018). Threat of Urban Jihadism in South Asia. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses​, ​10​(3). 
13 Ibid. 
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Those who cannot afford to travel to the Middle East are encouraged to travel to South and 
Southeast Asia, in particular, Myanmar or the Philippines. The methods of terrorism have also 
changed as the organization tries to gain a foothold in Southeast Asia. Others have noticed that 
there is an increase in stabbings and vehicular homicides for acts of terrorism in Southeast Asia 
compaed to the Middle East, as well as bank robberies, kidnapping for ransom, and online thefts.
 Further analysis of the situation in Southeast Asia stopped after identifying methods, however, 14
the research is carried further by other researchers who have found a connection between the 
increase of certain terrorist tactics with a reliance on organized criminal networks already in 
place. 
Security experts and political researchers have been informing states in Southeast Asia 
since 2014 about the returning wave of terrorists from Syria and Iraq to their countries  and IS’ 15
plans to establish a ​wilayah​ in the region.  While the general consensus of how to handle the 16
rising tide of terrorism varies from expert to expert, there is agreement that ties between Afghan 
extremist groups and Mindanao insurgents from the Philippines played a key role in uniting the 
various extremist groups of Southeast Asia such as: ​Negara Islam Indonesia, KOMPAK and 
Ring Banten in Indonesia, Kumpulan Mujahidin in Malaysia, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
in the Philippines.   17
14 Habulan, A., Taufiqurrohman, M., Jani, M., Bashar, I., Zhi’An, F., & Yasin, N. (2018). Southeast Asia: 
Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Online Extremism. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses,​ ​10​(1), 7-30. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26349853 
15 Quilala, D. (2018). Narratives and Counter-Narratives: Responding to Political Violence in the Philippines. 
Southeast Asian Affairs,​ 285-296. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26492782 
16 Ryacudu, R. (2018). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks. ​Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(11), 1-3. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26514859 
17 Singh, B. (2018). Terrorist Networks in Southeast Asia and Implications for Regional Security. ​Counter Terrorist 
Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(5), 8-10. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26435153 
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Second, the literature is concerned with the procurement of funds for terrorist activities 
and how their activities separate them from organized crime. Many researchers want to situate 
this line along different points along the crime-terror nexus, and some are unwilling to draw that 
line at all. Makarenko conducted a study in 2004 focused primarily on the Abu Sayyaf group, 
operating mainly in the Philippines, due to this group’s fluctuating status as either an organized 
crime gang or terrorist organization. They attribute the rise of organized crime gangs which can 
behave as terrorist organizations to growing reliance in the region on cross-border criminal 
activities, open borders, weak states, immigration flows, financial technology and an intricate 
and accessible global transportation infrastructure.   18
Makarenko, for example, categorizes Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist organization because of 
their announced allegiance to IS, despite the group acting more as an organized crime gang than 
a terrorist organization. There are, however, many political scientists who caution against this 
type of categorization as it can lead to legitimizing gangs who only declare allegiance to 
well-funded terrorist organizations, such as IS, in the hopes of receiving money and support from 
these organizations.  This difficulty in categorizing violent groups can be classified as the 19
‘convergence thesis’ along the crime-terror continuum, which states that criminal and terrorist 
organizations can “converge into a single entity that initially displays characteristics of both 
groups simultaneously, but has the potential to transform itself into an entity situated at the 
opposite end of the continuum from which it began.”   20
18 Makarenko, T. (2004). The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised 
Crime and Terrorism. ​Global Crime​, ​6​(1), 129–145. doi: 10.1080/1744057042000297025 
19 Franco, J. (2017). UNCERTAINTY IN DUTERTE’S MUSLIM MINDANAO. ​Southeast Asian Affairs,​ 297-312. 
Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26492612 
20 Makarenko, T. (2004). The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between Transnational Organised 
Crime and Terrorism. ​Global Crime​, ​6​(1), 129–145. doi: 10.1080/1744057042000297025 
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Alliances exists, of course, between both organized crime and terrorism. The Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan utilized a strategic relationship with the Afghan drug mafia and Central 
Asian criminal groups so as to ensure that shipments of heroin could be transported between 
Afghanistan, the Russian Federation, and the Caucasus.  However, the transisiton of organized 21
crime to terrorism has the potential to be particularly worrying for Southeast Asia as organized 
criminal gangs already have the knowledge and connections necessary to exploit financial gain 
within their home countries and the transition to a terrorist organization means they are taking 
that knowledge with them. This transition jeopardizes the security of countries such as the 
Philippines and Indonesia, and it signifies an opportunity for IS, which has shown itself to be 
eager to establish more permanent roots in a new battleground.   22
The conflict areas in Southeast Asia which have arisen from hostilities due to recent 
irregular migrant movements are also the center for cross-border drug trafficking and 
kidnap-for-ransom activities. Researchers have also found that these areas are also particularly 
interesting for extremist groups who can profit from the criminal activities already in place and 
can recruit from populations that are angered by recent immigration and economic instability.  23
This can create an even greater incentive for organized crime to transition to more terroristic 
activities as they come into contact and are influenced by extremist organizations moving into 
the area promising them additional support and protection from the government. 
Third, the literature to date has examined how groups recruit in Southeast Asia. The 
problem facing recruiters in Southeast Asia is that they need specialized talent more so than 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Sumpter, C., & Franco, J. (2018). Migration, Transnational Crime and Terrorism: Exploring the Nexus in Europe 
and Southeast Asia. ​Perspectives on Terrorism,​ ​12​(5), 36-50. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from 
www.jstor.org/stable/26515430 
TERRORISM AND RESOURCE CORRUPTION       9 
regular fighters at this point as they need individuals who can go on to become leaders and 
teachers for the fighters in the future when ISIL tries to push for the formation of a ​wilayah. 
Recruitment tactics for enticing educated individuals into an organization are different than the 
tactics used on a general population to entice fighters. Researchers have found that in Southeast 
Asia, prisons appear to be the most productive recruitment sites as it offers an environment 
where convicted terrorists and ordinary criminals can communicate and build connections 
between organizations, which will then be utilized once they are eventually released.  24
There is the additional risk of prisoners being radicalised by imprisoned ideologues. 
Researchers have found that Indonesia is particularly at risk for radicalization of common 
criminals through the prison system and that jihadis in Indonesia frequently form the most potent 
gangs with access to better food and conditions through intimidation of the guards. These 
“perks” that Indonesian jihadis are afforded make their organizations more attractive to regular 
criminal inmates who will then likely develop extremist convictions.   25
Furthermore, the recruitment that occurs in prisons is more likely to attract experienced 
and skilled individuals who are of interest to a growing terrorist organization as those criminals 
in prison have already proven themselves dangerous enough to have been deemed a threat to 
society and arrested. Steckman published an article detailing how the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
of the Philippines, was shown to have strong Malaysian connections through Malaysian bomb 
makers who had communicated with and even  educated members of the organization while in 
prison together on bomb construction techniques. Noordin Top, a notorious Malaysian bomb 
24 Sumpter, C., & Franco, J. (2018). Migration, Transnational Crime and Terrorism: Exploring the Nexus in Europe 
and Southeast Asia. ​Perspectives on Terrorism,​ ​12​(5), 36-50. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from 
www.jstor.org/stable/26515430 
25 Ibid. 
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maker and former member of Al-Qaeda, also had ties with ASG that originated from his time in 
prison.  ISIL is then able to exploit the connections that their returning fighters make in prison 26
with local criminals, developing an understanding of local and regional contexts while building a 
so-called “three pronged menace” to Malaysia, the Philippines, and the wider Southeast Asia 
region.  27
Lastly, the scholarship explores the connection between the growing rise of terrorism in 
the region and the exploitation of natural resources has briefly analyzed by other researchers 
under the concept of terrorist financing. Financing can be separated into two distinct groups of 
financial activities: the provision of funds necessary to carry out terrorist operations such as 
lodging and audio-video equipment, and the raising of funds to support terrorist attacks, training, 
and propaganda. Most researchers have focused on financing activiteds such as drug and human 
trafficking, arms trading, kidnapping, and robbery.  An even greater amount of research has 28
been dedicated to the way in which terrorist organizations will hide money transfers and 
fundraising campaigns behind legitimate charities.   29
Although researchers admit that authorities have detected only a few cases of terrorism 
financing happening through charities in Southereast Asia, they caution that there are still a 
significant numer of chairites and non-profits which have the capacity to raise large amounts of 
funds and are vulnerable to abuse by terrorism financing.  My research is focused as well on 30
26 Steckman, L. (2016). The Abu Sayyaf-ISIS Nexus: Rising Extremism and its Implications for Malaysia. ​Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​8​(5), 16-21. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26351418 
27Ibid. 
28 Clunan, A. (2006). The Fight against Terrorist Financing. ​Political Science Quarterly,​ ​121​(4), 569-596. Retrieved 
March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/20202763 
29Bantekas, I. (2003). The International Law of Terrorist Financing. ​American Journal of International Law,​ ​97​(2), 
315-333. doi:10.2307/3100109 
30 Santoso, A., & Laksmi, S. (2016). Regional Terrorism Financing Risk Assessment Framework: Southeast Asia 
and Australia. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,8​(10), 20-24. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from 
www.jstor.org/stable/26351460 
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vulnerable entities within the Southeast Asian economy, however, I argue that researchers have 
long been overlooking an even more vulnerable and easily exploitable source of income for 
terrorists- natural resources. The benefit of a charity or non-profit is that they can theoretically 
change locations from a geographical area where they are being threatened, natural resources 
cannot be moved and often contribute a significant portion to the stability of certain regions, 
making them even more attractive targets to terrorists who want to exert control over a certain 
region or population. The exploitation of natural resources has also been a common theme 
amongst organized crime in Southeast Asia for longer than the exploitation of charities or 
nonprofits, and as researchers can agree on, terrorists often borrow ideas and tactics from 
organized crime when it comes to raising funds and growing their base of support. 
Natural Resource Extraction and Exploitation 
There have been very few studies so far which focus on the possible connection between 
the exploitation of natural resources and terrorism. One study, conducted by Bhattacharya, found 
that terrorist groups are more interested in resource extraction rather than resource provision to 
the communities over which they have control.  However, this study focused on a different set 31
of resources: robbery or protection payments, and more tangible goods such as guns and food.  
Along a different vein of research, though one which could have significant implications 
for my own thesis, there are many studies which analyze the effect that terrorism has on trade 
and economic policy within the target country. Asongu found in a 2019 study, that developing 
countries, such as the Philippines or Indonesia, which are experiencing an increase in terrorist 
31 Bhattacharya, S. (2017). Comparing Civilian Support for Terrorism. ​Journal of Strategic Security,​ ​10​(2), 1-32. 
Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26466840 
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activity may be motivated to increase or enhance export volumes in order to increase the 
incremental government budget needed to combat said terrorist activity.  32
One of the most comprehensive studies examined the negative effects that natural 
resources, in this case extractive industries, can have on the economy and the potential of those 
effects to bolster violence.  Wayland found that there are key characteristics of extractive 33
industries which make them more likely to promote negative institutional outcomes within the 
economy of the Philippines such as introducing high-profit sources of income into economies 
which means that the supply of funds that companies can use as bribes increases as the extractive 
industry increases.  This analysis focused mainly on the New People’s Army (NPA) of the 34
Philippines, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines which has been waging 
war against the Philippine government throughout the countryside.  
The empirical results of Wayland’s study found that the environmental and 
socioeconomic impacts of extractive industries in the Philippines actually shapes NPA behavior 
due to the presence of unpermitted mining activity. Unpermitted activity leads to higher levels of 
economic inequality in the region which, in turn, increases the probability of NPA violence.  35
This study ultimately found that it was unpermitted extractive activities which had the largest 
effect on NPA behavior and levels of violence due to the economic inequality and deforestation 
that happened around the areas of the unpermitted mines. Wayland attributed this to the fact that 
32 Asongu, S. (2019). Natural Resource Exports, Foreign Aid and Terrorism. ​International Journal of Development 
and Conflict​. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3385749 
33 Wayland, J. J. (2018). Natural Resources, Civil Conflict, and the Political Ecology of Scale. ​Digital Repository at 
the University of Maryland​. 
34 Ibid. 
35Ibid. 
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economic inequality increased anger amongst the population that lived around the mine and 
made them more susceptible to the teachings of the NPA.   36
When a population feels as though their government is not protecting or providing for 
them, they will turn to alternative forms of governance for those provisions, in this case the 
resources offered by the NPA. While Wayland’s study found a correlation between exploitation 
of mining industries and an increase in terrorism, I argue this relationship could be expanded 
further to include other forms of natural resource extraction such as fishing and logging. 
Extractive industries are not the only industries susceptible to corruption and therefore not the 
only industries which could help fund or strengthen terrorists’ presence in a particular region. 
 
Theory 
I argue that as more ISIL fighters return home, they will exploit organized crime and 
corruption networks already in place in Southeast Asia in order to fund the creation of new 
terrorist cells in their home regions. My theoretical expectations are based partly on the Resource 
Curse, a theory which seeks to explain why some of the most natural resource-rich countries in 
the world have some of the lowest standards of living amongst a population which should be 
benefitting. It also encompasses the massive social, economic, and political challenges that seem 
to exist primarily in countries rich in gas, oil, and minerals. This theory posits several reasons for 
this phenomenon, though the two primary ones are: authoritarian governments frequently arise in 
natural-resource rich countries due to the government’s desire to have as much control over 
wealth as possible or that governments can get trapped in boom-bust cycles where they spend 
36Ibid. 
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large amounts of money on legacy projects, such as monuments or airports, when profits are 
rising, but then make cuts in social and public welfare funds when profits decline.  37
My theory incorporates the logic of the Resource Curse in that the mechanism by which 
the corruption the Resource Curse states natural resources are susceptible to, is likely the same 
mechanism which could entice terrorists to take advantage of these highly profitable and easily 
corruptible sources of income. Additionally, the economic inequality and depression which is so 
often found in regions that should be rich from their natural resources, causes dissatisfaction and 
anger towards the government amongst the population of the region. This anger can make people 
more susceptible to recruitment tactics used by terrorists who come into communities offering 
resources, money, and protection in exchange for the peoples’ support or at least tacit 
cooperation. 
The Resource Curse also explains how natural resources more often benefit a government 
rather than the people that surround them for other, non-corruption based reasons. Extractive 
industries are organized to generate profits, not benefit locals. Few jobs from extractive 
industries and other natural resource extraction industries very seldom create jobs for locals, but 
rather bring in foreign, usually cheaper labor.  This influx of immigrant workers also inflames 38
local tensions against the government, which again only benefits terrorist fear-mongering and 
xenophobic rhetoric. The machinery, that is often used is mostly imported nowadays, is 
extremely specialized and decreases the amount of jobs that are offered in general as automation 
seems to be the general trend in the industry.  39
37 The Resource Curse: The Political and Economic Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth. (2015). ​Natural 
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Both of these factors should increase the threshold of violence which communities are 
willing to tolerate from terrorist organizations in the region as their loyalties shift away from a 
government they perceive as having betrayed or simply left them behind. Some communities are 
not given a choice between whether a mine will be set up or a logging company will be allowed 
to work in the region, and those that are given a choice are usually promised great wealth and a 
brighter future from the opportunities that the industry says it will bring to the community. 
When, several years or even months later, communities realize they are actually suffering from 
their “good fortune” rather than benefiting as was promised or hoped for, they are likely to look 
for a new source of success for their community or a force which promises to drive the perceived 
“foreign threat” out of the community. This is where terrorist recruiters and fighters step in, to 
offer communities a source of leadership and resources, even if those terrorist organizations are 
likely economically benefiting from natural resource extractions through their relationship with 
organized crime networks. 
Additionally, the Resource Curse also shows that policy makers and political elites in 
natural resource-rich countries are less likely to invest in other productive industries, mainly 
job-creating manufacturing industries, and instead fight for control of the natural-resource 
extractive industries.  This is where there is a critical overlap between the Resource Curse 40
theory and the theory known as “Dutch Disease.” Dutch Disease refers to a significant increase 
in natural resource revenues which can hurt other sectors of the economy, in particular 
40 The Resource Curse: The Political and Economic Challenges of Natural Resource Wealth. (2015). ​Natural 
Resource Governance Institute​. Retrieved from 
https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/nrgi_Resource-Curse.pdf 
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export-based manufacturing, by causing inflation or exchange rate appreciation while shifting 
labor from non-resource industries to the resource industry.  41
This breakdown of the manufacturing industry is crucial to my own theory as it shows 
that resource rich countries also have a significant population of workers and skilled individuals 
who can find themselves without a job and without future prospects due to the destruction that 
resource industries, especially illegal or unchecked forms of resource industries that can wreak 
on a country’s economy. As the literature discussed earlier suggests, as ISIL moves into 
Southeast Asia and tries to establish a new, stronger foothold, they need to recruit skilled and 
experienced members first before they focus their recruitment tactics on the common fighter. 
This is why I believe the most natural resource rich countries in Southeast Asia will be the ones 
who experience the largest increase in terrorist activity as ISIL leadership and returning fighters 
move back to the region. 
Politicians and high-ranking government officials in the past, regardless of region, have 
intentionally removed societal checks or created new legislation and regulations in order to 
further their own personal profits from natural resource extraction.  If not financial gain, they 42
have also exploited natural resources to benefit from the stress and anger these industries can 
cause on economic, social, and cultural relations. As stated before, extraction projects will attract 
large influxes of people to areas that may not have the infrastructure to support them or the jobs 
within that industry may not be there either.  These last factors pertaining to the Resource Curse 43
show that the corruption which so often plagues natural resources and their extraction and sale is 
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who have far more to gain from supporting the corruption rather than taking a closer look at 
these industries to determine if it is only organized crime which is siphoning off funds. This 
umbrella of corruption and the lack of oversight, I argue, is the perfect environment for terrorist 
cells to embed themselves and profit greatly before any officials are made aware that there could 
be a problem greater than the local mafia. 
How then can natural resources provide the perfect funding source for returning ISIL 
fighters to gather the necessary resources to “continue the fight”? First of all, a continuous war or 
even sustained insurgency is an expensive endeavor. To conduct a single attack is relatively 
inexpensive for a terrorist organization, even notable, history-changing attacks. Al-Qaeda’s 
attack on the World Trade Center is reported to have cost the group less than 1% of its estimated 
annual budget.  However, if ISIL is to establish a ​wilayah ​in Southeast Asia, they will need far 44
more funding than what is required for a few attacks, no matter the estimated damage of said 
attacks. They will need to fund an operation which will involve thousands of combatants, 
recruiters, support staff, weapons acquisition, training, personnel and equipment transportation, 
housing for fighters, and general administration. According to one paper published in 2018, ISIL 
spent nearly $1.9 billion USD funding the war in Iraq in Syria in  2014 alone.  Obviously, 45
weaponry has gotten more advanced since 2014, and that weaponry is more expensive. 
Additionally, counter-terrorism tactics have gotten more advanced, both in traditional warfare 
44 Shapiro, J. N., & Siegel, D. A. (2009). Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations. ​Mathematical Methods in 
Counterterrorism​, 349–382. doi: 10.1007/978-3-211-09442-6_21 
45 Rose, G. (2018). Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(2), 
11-16. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26358996 
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and cyber warfare, meaning that terrorist organization will need to expend even more resourcds 
and funds if they want to make any progress in the region.   46
Terrorist organizations have often used natural resource extraction to fund their activities, 
a clear example is IS and All-Qaeda using proceeds from oil production facilities in Iraq to fund 
their activities. Counter-terrorism measures have already taken this in to account as many of 
those facilities were strategically targeted by US forces to weaken the fiancial resources of the 
terrorist organizations.  However, although there has been a small body of research tracking the 47
corruption of natural resource industries in Southeast Asia and the connection between these 
industries and organized crime, there has been very little analysis or research done on the 
combined threat of returning ISIL fighters and natural resource corruption. I theorize that this 
connection already exists and will only grow stronger and more prevalent as more fighters return 
home and ISIL sends more foreign fighters to the region to make gains on a new battleground. 
 
Method 
To determine whether there is a connection between returning ISIL fighters and the 
exploitation of natural resources to fund terrorist activity, I will employ the Indicator Method as 
explained in ​Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis .​ ​This method involves 48
establishing an indicator list, then separating those indicators into different scenarios. This 
technique is most commonly used by security and intelligence analysts to track events, identify 
emerging trends, and warn of unanticipated changes, particularly in situations which are in the 
46 Ryacudu, R. (2018). Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Need for Joint Counter-Terrorism Frameworks. ​Counter 
Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(11), 1-3. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26514859 
47 Rose, G. (2018). Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(2), 
11-16. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26358996 
48Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, ​149 
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early stages of development, but have the potential to explode quickly.  I will use this form of 49
analysis as it allows me to first determine if the situation has a strong potential for emerging at 
all in the region. If returning fighters are exploiting natural resources to gather funds for creating 
a larger, more stable network of cells in Southeast Asia, then the situation is still in its infancy. 
However, it is crucial to identify the factors that can be tracked now, to hopefully prevent the 
sort of devastating attack, such as Al-Qaeda’s attack on the Twin Towers, which quickly turned 
overnight into war in the Middle East. 
The Indicators Method has been used  by intelligence analysts to determine which 
scenario will most likely occur based on known factors of a developing situation​.  ​Indicators 50
were used only if they were: observable and collectible, valid, reliable, stable, and unique. The 
last factor pertains to whether an indicator could be a signal for multiple scenarios, the indicators 
I will use are different for each scenario generated to ensure that there is a clearer distinction for 
the most probable future. I will use descriptive indicators as they are most commonly used to 
help assess whether sufficient grounds exist that a specific action is taking place.  51
After I compile the descriptive indicators, I will then separate them into three different 
scenarios: ISIL fighters are returning but not establishing new cells, ISIL fighters are returning 
and establishing cells but natural resource exploitation makes up very little no none of their 
funding, ISIL fighters are returning and establishing cells and using the exploitation of natural 
resources to fund a significant portion of their activities. I will create indicators and separate 
them into these three scenarios for one case study: the Philippines. This country was chosen as 
49Ibid. 
50Ibid. 
51Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, ​149 
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the case study because the highest number of attacks perpetrated by ISIL in Southeast Asia have 
been carried out in this country 
I chose to use the Indicator method not only for what it can help predict, but also for the 
ways in which the method can prevent Hindsight Bias as the indicators are decided on and 
recorded before the analysis begins. This method of analysis also ensures that the analysis 
determines whether the situation is emerging at all in the region. If foreign fighters are returning 
to the Philippines and establishing new cells, possibly exploiting natural resources or not, then 
this indicator list could be used in further analyses to pinpoint future areas of high activity or 
emerging leaders in the situation. However, the indicators will also allow me to scrutinize 
information to ensure that I am not interpreting information simply to support the thesis. 
Eventually, this list could be expanded as the situation in the Philippines progresses, making it an 











TERRORISM AND RESOURCE CORRUPTION       21 
Indicator List 
Scenario 1: ISIL fighters are 
returning but not establishing new 
cells 
Scenario 2: ISIL fighters are 
returning and establishing cells, but 
natural resource exploitation makes 
up very little to none of their 
funding 
Scenario 3: ISIL fighters are 
returning and establishing cells and 
using the exploitation of natural 
resources to fund a significant 
portion of their activities 
● No significant change in 
GDP 
● Decrease or no 
significant increase in 
number of attacks 
attributed to terrorist 
activity 
● No evidence of a 
connection between 
organized crime and 
terrorist causes 
● Segmented, disorganized 
terrorist factions 
existing, though with 
lack of capability to 
organize and carry out 
attacks 
● Established, armed 
groups swearing 
allegiance to IS 
● Increase in fighters 
travelling to the 
Philippines 
● Lack of government 
capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist 
activity 
● Decline in support for 
traditional political 
parties, with no regional 
connection to natural 
resources 
● Evidence of significant 
funds being laundered 
through charities 
● Funds for armed groups 
who pledge allegiance to 
IS are taken mainly from 
other sources than 
natural resources 
● Evidence of direct funds 




● Established, armed 
groups swearing 
allegiance to IS 
● Increase in fighters 
travelling to the 
Philippines 
● Lack of government 
capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist 
activity 
● Decline in support for 
traditional political 
parties, with connection 
to regions known for 
natural resources 
● Increase in attacks in 
areas rich in natural 
resource extraction 
● Funds for armed groups 
who pledge allegiance to 
IS are taken mainly from 
natural resources 
● Ties with politicians with 
known connections to 
natural resource 
corruption 
● Materials used for attacks 




Indicators for the first scenario are based mainly on lack of evidence or change. A 
significant change in GDP that cannot be explained through an increase in trade, or other 
TERRORISM AND RESOURCE CORRUPTION       22 
observable, legal means, could signify an increase in illegal funds being funneled into the 
economy of the Philippines. According to economists, Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman, in 
their book ​Chasing Dirty Money​, financial crime is so widespread that up to 10 percent of the 
global GDP is estimated to be laundered funds.  Therefore, no significant change in GDP could 52
signify that no significant amount of illegal funds are being sent to the Philippines for organized 
crime or terrorist activity. Additionally, if ISIL fighters are returning, but not setting up new 
cells, then there would most likely not be an increase in organized terrorist attacks or connections 
between terrorist organizations and organized crime. Also, if existing terrorist organizations are 
coalescing under the banner of ISIL and receiving funds to carry out attacks, then there would be 
a more organized force existing in the Philippines 
For the second and third scenarios, terrorist groups swearing allegiance to ISIL and local 
support declining for traditional political parties would be indicators that ISIL fighters are trying 
to increase the organization’s presence and sway in the region.  However, if the decline in 53
support for traditional political parties is not observed occurring mainly in natural resource rich 
areas, then that means that ISIL is most likely influencing communities and drawing funds from 
other sources. Fighters could also be relying more on funds from charities rather than extractive 
industries  or could be receiving direct funds from ISIL (signifying a lack of fund-gathering by 54
regional terrorists). 
52 Reuter, P., & Truman, E. M. (2004). Chasing Dirty Money: The Fight Against Money Laundering. Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics. 
53 Bhattacharya, 2017 
54 Rose, G. (2018). Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(2), 
11-16. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26358996 
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Finally, the last indicator for scenario three, attack materials taken from sources of 
natural resource extraction, would be evidence of extractive industries supporting returning ISIL 








Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), an extremist organization established 
in the Philippines in 1989, pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014.   56
2, 3 Established, armed groups swearing 
allegiance to IS 
 
2 Currently, the ASG has been fragmented into separate factions 
after the killings or arrests of its top leaders.  57
1 Segmented, disorganized terrorist factions 
currently existing. 
3 ASG earns most of its money from extortion of locals and 
kidnapping.  58
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources. 
4 The siege of Marawi was led by the Maute Group and Abu 
Sayyaf, both have pledged allegiance to IS, and IS central 
leadership sent $600,000 USD directly to the militant in order to 
fund the operation.  59
2 Evidence of direct funds received from IS 
(lack of fund-gathering by regional terrorists) 
 
5 The most active region in the Philippines (regarding terrorist 
activity) is the region of Mindanao, where the Muslim 
population, have been struggling with the Philippine government 
to assert their cultural identity and achieve self-rule.  60
1 Terrorist activity occurring with a goal 
besides establishing a ​wilayah ​for IS 
6 Military officials have reported that after the siege of Marawi in 
Mindanao, IS-inspired militants resumed recruitment and 
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
55 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2017). ​World Drug Report 2017​. Retrieved from 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf 
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radicalisation activities in other parts of Mindanao. They are 
targeting communities with abnormally high rates of poverty and 
disillusionment with government assistance.  61
natural resources 
7 A country risk firm, Pacific Strategies and Assessments, 
recorded an increase in the frequency of violent NPA (a 
communist insurgency) activities in the region of Luzon. The 
form of these activities include extortion, ambush, arson, and 
bombings; targeted mainly against government forces.  62
2 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with no regional connection to 
natural resources 
8 Islamic extremists in Mindanao conduct raids against mining 
companies to acquire C-4 explosives for their attacks. They also 
sell additional C-4 from these raids on the Dark Web.  63
3 Materials used for attacks taken from sites of 
natural resource extraction 
9 “Warlords and strongmen”, located mainly in the Southern 
Philippines, use kidnapping and ransom to control followers and 
generate funds.  64
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
10 Kidna​ppings in the Philippines are mainly instigated by power 
brokers, who collaborate with local armed groups  for profit.  65
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
11 Lack of centralized government in the Southern Philippines 
leading to segmentary structure of local societies.  66
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
 
12 Reliance on personal followings and alliances as sources of 
political power in the Southern Philippines.  67
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
13 Kidnappings, ransom, and beheadings remain the most common 
actions undertaken by the ISIL-affiliated organization Abu 
Sayyaf, and terrorists who operate in Abu Sayyaf controlled 
territory.  68
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
14 Mining companies pay millions of dollars in bribes every year to 
armed groups in the Philippines because, once a mine has been 
3 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from 
61 De Leon, R., Rufo, M., & Pablo, M. (2018). Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the Philippines: 
Grassroots Empowerment and Development of Homeland Security Framework. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and 
Analyses,​ ​10​(8), 10-17. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26481829 
62 Ibid. 
63 Nahdohdin, M., Angelianawati, D., Prasetya, A., Yaoren, K., Dhanaraj, J., Bashar, I., . . . Nasir, A. (2019). 
SOUTHEAST ASIA: Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore. ​Counter Terrorist Trends 
and Analyses,​ ​11​(1), 6-32. Retrieved March 13, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/26568577 
64 Ugarte, E. F. (2008). The Phenomenon of Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines. ​South East Asia Research​, 
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established, it cannot be relocated so the companies have no 
choice.  69
natural resources 
15 Armed groups are more likely to target mining sites that exist in 
communities with large wealth disparities due to the community 
support that can be garnered from attacking “political cronies.”  70
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
16 Campaign staffers for politicians in the Philippines are reported 
to regularly discuss “whether it would be a better ‘investment’ to 
purchase votes or to bribe election officials to disqualify their 
opponents.”  71
2 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with no regional connection to 
natural resources 
17 The Abu Sayyaf Group branch operating in the Basilan region of 
the Philippines was officially recognized as “IS Basilan” by 
official ISIS leadership.  72
2,3 Established, armed groups swearing 
allegiance to IS 
18 The “IS Basilan” group has not changed their fund-gathering 
activities since branching off from the ASG, they continue to 
prefer low-key extortion activities.  73
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
 
19 The Basilan region of the Philippines is referred to as 
“Mindanao’s best war laboratory” due to the large number and 
diversity of armed groups in the region.  74
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
20 The Basilan region is host to a large number of armed groups 
due to lack of government interference and the reliance of the 
populace on unofficial leaders, warlords, and armed groups in 
the region.  75
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
21 The Phillipine government regulates the licensing of gun 
owners, but does not regulate or track the use of firearms or 
ammunition after purchase.  76
2,3 Lack of government capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist activity 
22 The Philippines is regarded as one of the many destinations for 
migration in the region and attracts regional fighters from both 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  77
2,3 Increase in fighters travelling to the 
Philippines 
69 Wayland, J. J. (2018). Natural Resources, Civil Conflict, and the Political Ecology of Scale. ​Digital Repository at 
the University of Maryland​. 
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23 There is an increasing trend, as of 2018, of European foreign 
fighters trying to travel to the Philippines with the purpose of 
joining IS-linked groups.  78
2,3 Increase in fighters travelling to the 
Philippines 
24 ASG Sawadjaan faction is known mainly for kidnapping 
Westerners and executing them sometimes. In 2016, the group 
executed two Canadian hostages - John Ridsdel and Robert Hall.
 79
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
25 The ASG Sulu faction kidnapped a German national, Juegen 
Kantner, from a yacht off the coast of western Mindanao.  80
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
26 The Maute Group first existed as an extortion gang which 
targeted sawmill operators, and bombing electrical transmission 
towers of the state-owned TRANSCO firm.  81
2 Funds for armed groups who pledge 
allegiance to IS are taken mainly from other 
sources than natural resources 
27 The Maute Group occupied the town of Butig in February 2016 
and again in November 2016, after they proclaimed allegiance in 
ISIL, only retreating after many of the civilians fled the town.  82
2, 3 Lack of government capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist activity 
28 The resilience of the Maute Group is attributed to their kinship 
ties with local politicians in the provinces of their operation.  83
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
29 The Maute Group and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF) share kinship ties and resources.  84
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
30 The MILF group is not affiliated with ISIL, they are focused 
more on ethnic and religious independence for a specific region 
than Islamic ideology.  85
1 Segmented, disorganized terrorist factions 
existing, though with lack of capability to 
organize and carry out attacks 
31 The Bangsomoro Islamic Freedom Fighters pledged allegiance 
to ISIS in 2015, but is thought to be less concerned with the 
pan-Islmaic narrative, and more concerned with using the “ISIS 
brand” to further its own goals in the Philippines.  86
1 Segmented, disorganized terrorist factions 
existing, though with lack of capability to 
organize and carry out attacks 
32 The BIFF’s main goal is to increase its stature among other 
private militias operated by politicians in Mindanao as “private 
armies.”  87
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
 
78 Ibid. 
79 Franco, J. (2017). UNCERTAINTY IN DUTERTE’S MUSLIM MINDANAO. ​Southeast Asian Affairs,​ 297-312. 









TERRORISM AND RESOURCE CORRUPTION       27 
33 The BIFF are currently split between a pro-ISIS faction and the 
“mainstream” faction, each headed by two different 
commanders.  88
1 Segmented, disorganized terrorist factions 
existing, though with lack of capability to 
organize and carry out attacks 
 
34 Indonesian and Malaysian jihadists have stated an intent to wage 
jihad in the Mindanao region of the Philippines instead of 
travelling to Syria or Iraq.  89
2, 3 Increase in fighters travelling to the 
Philippines 
35 Regional fighters who choose to wage jihad in the Philippines 
instead of the Middle East are more likely to avoid detection by 
state security forces due to the lesser distance of travel.  90
2, 3 Lack of government capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist activity 
36 Travelling to the Middle East is expensive for fighters from 
Southeast Asia, many choose to wage jihad in their home 
countries or in the Philippines due to lack of funds.  91
2, 3 Increase in fighters travelling to the 
Philippines 
37 According to the Philippine military, the conflict in Marawi City 
was so able to drag on so long to the military’s lack of urban 
warfare capabilities.  92
2, 3 Lack of government capability in assessing 
and tracking terrorist activity 
38 Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced as a result of 
the Marawi City siege, making them economically vulnerable to 
exploitation by armed groups which remained in the region.  93
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
39 The Philippine government reports that the terrorist fighters in 
the Marawi City siege were well-prepared and well-organized, 
also adding to the drawn out nature of the battle.  94
2 Evidence of direct funds received from IS 
(lack of fund-gathering by regional terrorists) 
40 ASG organized a suicide bombing in July 2018 in the Lamitan 
region through the cooperation of the ASG subleader and a 
Moroocan national. IS claimed the bombing as well.  95
3 Increase in attacks in areas rich in natural 
resource extraction 
41 In 2015, the Philippine Statistics Authority reported that four out 
of five of the poorest population in the Philippines were located 
in Mindanao.  96
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
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42 Mindanao is reported as one of the most resource-laden regions 
of the Philippines, but that wealth has not been distributed to the 
people of the region.  97
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
43 The Moro people of the Mindanao region are unable to benefit 
from the natural riches of the region. This is the same 
ethnic/religious minority group which feeds many fighters into 
the MILF group.  98
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
44 The mining industry has continued to increase in size in the 
Philippines due to the Mining Act of 1995, which granted the 
industry certain benefits such as: a four-year income tax holiday, 
tax exemptions, and tax deductions for operating losses.  99
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
45 The Philippine government regularly uses violent force against 
anti-mining activists who protest against destructive 
environmental impacts, government corruption, and abuses.  100
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
46 A study estimated that more than 1,330 people involved with 
anti-mining activism were assassinated between 2001 and 2012, 
with the tacit or explicit approval of government officials.  101
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
47 Armed groups are known to be outspoken against mining 
operations in the Philippines due to the “imperialist plunder” of 
natural resources, but levy “taxes” on those industries to fund 
their own violent operations.  102
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
48 A businessperson who operates between the Philippines and 
other countries stated in an interview that “the payment of bribes 
in exchange for approvals was discussed in the context of regular 
business costs, with the understanding that the purchased 
officials would be responsible for dealing with community 
relations.”  103
3 Ties with politicians with known connections 
to natural resource corruption 
49 An anti-mining activist said in an interview with a political 
scientist analyzing industry corruption in the region, “...at first, I 
thought I really didn’t like the Chinese because they are 
destroying the environment. But what I’ve learned is that it is the 
politicians who are destroying it.”  104
3 Decline in support for traditional political 
parties, with connection to regions known for 
natural resources 
50 The Maute Group was most likely able to siphon several million 
AUD from the Australian government. Between 2012 and 2017, 
the Australian government gave around 12 million AUD to 
2 Evidence of significant funds being 
laundered through charities 
97 ​Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
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Habitat for Humanity to build homes in the Mindanao region, 
but the charity sub-contracted through a construction company 
that was later discovered to be a business run by Maute Group 
leadership.  105
 
Of the three scenarios, the third scenario had more indicators pointing to it being the most 
likely outcome. 32 of the facts corresponded to indicators for scenario 3. However, the second 
scenario was identified 23 times in the analysis, which indicates that a significant amount of the 
data implicates other sources of funding as being targets for terrorists. Scenario 1, was only 
identified five times in the analysis, indicating that new terrorist cells, in general, are most likely 
being established in the Philippines due to the return of foreign fighters as well as the increasing 
interest of regional fighters in waging a ​jihad​ in the Philippines, rather then travelling farther to 
the Middle East. The caveat, however, is that all five of the data points for scenario 1 identified 
in the analysis, were based on the last indicator concerning the segmented, disorganized nature of 
terrorist organizations in the Philippines. 
Ultimately, this analysis found that 1) foreign fighters are returning to the Philippines and 
establishing new cells, 2) they are using a combination of natural resource exploitation and other 
criminal activities to fund their operations, and 3) the structures and leadership of terrorist 
organizations in the Philippines is disorganized as many of the organizations have only just 
begun to pursue terrorist activities based on the pan-Islamic ideology of ISIL. 
 
Implications 
105 Rose, G. (2018). Terrorism Financing in Foreign Conflict Zones. ​Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses,​ ​10​(2), 
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Areas around natural resource extraction in the Philippines are host to different kinds of 
exploitation and, due to the nature of historic corruption around these industries, provide a 
particularly difficult environment in which to combat terrorism. Currently, the Philippine 
government has said that it does not have the capabilities nor training to deal with a mass 
terrorist attack like was seen in the siege of Marawi City.  The US military’s current MO in 106
fighting terrorist organizations (at the beginning before they have an intense hold over a nation) 
is to “win the heart and minds of the people”, which usually entails convincing local people that 
they will be well rewarded and protected if they serve as informants against the terrorists 
operating in the region.  Although terrorist organizations may not be using natural resource 107
exploitation to fund all of their operations, they are still most likely relying on these exploitative 
networks for a significant amount of funds, resources, and societal control. Therefore, they will 
intensely recruit and exert control over communities and politicians in areas of natural resource 
extraction.  
Additionally, terrorists have the benefit of operating in these communities which are 
often disenfranchised from the wealth and benefits that should come from the riches of natural 
resource extraction. Many communities, particularly in the Southern Philippines, have not 
benefited from the great wealth of the mining operations in the region.  This leads to 108
disillusionment with the government, because communities feel as though they are being ignored 
and pushed to the side, as well as for local politicians that are widely regarded as individuals who 
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line their pockets with profits that should have gone to public projects and social programs.  109
This disillusionment and anger makes countries more susceptible to terrorist propaganda and 
recruitment techniques, which in turn, make efforts to combat terrorism even more difficult in 
areas surrounding natural resource extraction as communities may decide to rely on the 
assistance of these organizations, rather than the Philippine government (which they don’t trust) 
or a foreing military (which they trust even less).  
From the analysis, it is apparent that there are already well-known connections between 
certain terrorist organizations and regional politicians with known corruption ties to the natural 
resource extraction industry. These connections should be investigated further by counter 
terrorism experts to determine which communities are being supported or controlled by rising 
terrorist cells, what grievances specifically these communities could have, and what the nature of 
the exploitation is on a case-by-case basis. Because many of the cells are still growing, and 
established armed groups in the Philippines have only just recently pledged allegiance to ISIL, 
the terrorists operating in the region are not extremely well-established, funded, or organized 
quite yet. Therefore, identifying sources of funds and connections with organized crime early 
will be a significant fact in whether these cells are able to wage any significant war in the 
Philippines. 
Another major implication of this analysis is the revelation that charities can be a major 
source of funding for terrorist organizations operating in the region, in particular, international 
charities with large bureaucracies that make it easier for illegal activity to disguise itself as legal. 
In no other case was this more evident than in the Habitat for Humanity case described in the 
109 Ibid. 
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analysis. The Australian government paid Habitat for Humanity around 12.7 million AUD to 
conduct a six-year project in the southern Philippines to build classrooms, science laboratories, 
and school libraries.  However, the charity subcontracted the project to a Philippine 110
construction company that, much later, would be revealed to be owned by members of the Maute 
family clan that had publicalicy pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. In late 2015, the contract was 
terminated, however, it was not due to the connection with terrorist activity, but rather because 
the project was “underperforming”.  It is estimated that the Maute clan was able to siphon 111
millions of dollars from the project’s budget and most likely used those funds during the 2017 
siege of Marawi city.  This case study, as well as other cases of false charities being used to 112
launder money in the region, shows that charities are a particularly lucrative and easily 
exploitable source of revenue for terrorists who are trying to further their cause and build new 
cells in the region. Moving forward, counterterrorism efforts should focus on gaining the loyalty 
of communities in areas where natural resource extraction and extortion are common, and where 
communities may feel disillusioned with their government and be susceptible to terrorist 
influence. Additionally, further research and analysis needs to be done on charities, both regional 
and international, which could be susceptible to terrorist financing. 
 
Conclusion 
As foreign fighters return to their home countries, having lost too much territory or 
resources, in the war waged in the Middle East, they will maintain the ideologies that originally 
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bolstered them to travel to a completely different part of the world to defend that ideology. These 
terrorists or terrorist sympathisers are known to be setting up new cells in the Philippines and 
recruiting fighters both within the country and from other Southeast Asian countries to wage a 
jihad​ in the Philippines and establish a ​wilayah​ under the ISIL banner. ISIL leadership has also 
expressed an interest in the Philippines as the next potential battleground and has been sending 
funds, demolition experts, leaders, and other resources to the region with the explicit purpose of 
furthering the next fight.  The exploitation of natural resources, the existing corruption that 113
exists around extractive industries, and the connections between organized crime and rising 
terrorist organizations signify that more attention should be paid towards these industries, 
especially in the Philippines, to ensure that terrorist organizations are not able to siphon funds 
and commit acts of terror and violence. While other sources of funds are also being exploited: 
charities, kidnapping, robbery, etc., the fact that extractive industries cannot be moved or 
relocated overnight, cannot hide itself behind bureaucracy, and is so deeply embedded in 
communities, means that they can be easily targeted both by terrorist and by counterterrorism 
forces. If an international effort is to be made to combat rising terrorism in Southeast Asia, then 
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